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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN THE
SUPREME COURT: RETHINKING THE
COURT'S APPROACH
Gary J. Simson t
Writing for the Supreme Court in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman,'
ChiefJustice Burger acknowledged that, in deciding what is permit-
ted and what is forbidden by the first amendment's prohibition on
laws "respecting an establishment of religion," 2 the Court could
"only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation. ' 3 According to the
ChiefJustice, in interpreting the "at best opaque" language of this
clause, the Court was obliged to "draw lines with reference to the
three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was in-
tended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and ac-
tive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.' "4 In a
passage that the Court and other courts would quote repeatedly in
later establishment clause decisions, he then went on to explain:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1971,J.D. 1974, Yale University. I
am grateful to various colleagues and students at Cornell and Berkeley for discussions of
the establishment clause that helped shape the ideas expressed in this Article. I espe-
cially thank Jesse Choper for his comments on an earlier draft of the Article and Rosa-
lind Simson for her suggestions throughout the writing of the Article.
1 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion .... ). The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been inter-
preted as making this prohibition applicable to the states. Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
3 403 U.S. at 612.
4 Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). The Court's princi-
pal discussions of the historical background of the clause appear in Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1947), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-36 (1962). In
both instances,Justice Black wrote the opinion of the Court. For a sense of the range of
views among scholars as to the implications of history for interpreting the clause, see R.
CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982); M. HOWE, TnE GARDEN AND THE WIL-
DERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965); P.
KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREE-
DOM (rev. ed. 1967).
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entanglement with religion." 5
By the mid-1980's, with Chief Justice Burger spearheading the
attack, this three-part test appeared headed for obsolescence.6 In
1983 the Court in Marsh v. Chambers7 rejected an establishment
clause challenge without applying the Lemon test. Marsh involved a
challenge to a state legislature's practice of opening its sessions with
a prayer by a state-paid chaplain. Writing for a 6-3 majority, the
Chief Justice ignored both the Lemon test and Justice Brennan's at-
tempt in dissent to show that the practice was utterly irreconcilable
with the test. Instead, he sustained the practice based on the
"unique history"8 of legislative prayer in the United States-in par-
ticular, the widespread existence of the practice since colonial times,
and the authorization by the Congress that proposed the first
amendment of the appointment of paid chaplains to open its ses-
sions with prayer.9
As Justice Brennan suggested in dissent,' 0 the Court's opinion
in Marsh can be understood as simply creating a limited exception
based on history to the application of the Lemon test. The Court's
opinion the following year in Lynch v. Donnelly,I' however, is much
less susceptible to a narrow reading as far as its implications for the
Lemon test. It seems to take the Court to the brink of repudiating
the test.
Lynch presented the question of whether the establishment
clause prevented a city from including a nativity scene in its annual
Christmas display. By a 5-4 margin the Court found no establish-
ment clause bar, and ChiefJustice Burger again wrote for the major-
ity. The ChiefJustice did not on this occasion ignore the Lemon test.
He applied it, however, in no more than form alone. According to
the Chief Justice, the city's inclusion of the creche in its Christmas
display was supported by two "legitimate secular purposes"-"to
celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of that Holiday. '"12
In addition, its primary effect plainly was not to advance religion
5 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970)).
6 For commentary calling for abandonment of the test, see Johnson, Concepts and
Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817 (1984); Kurland,
The h-elevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme
Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978); Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendmient and
the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847 (1984).
7 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Marsh is also discussed infra at text accompanying notes 99-
100.
8 463 U.S. at 791.
9 Id. at 786-91.
10 Id. at 795-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
12 Id. at 681.
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because "whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all religions
[exists here] is indirect, remote, and incidental."' 3 For present pur-
poses, I leave to the dissenting opinions in Lynch the task of demon-
strating for anyone who needs convincing the superficiality of this
application of the Lemon test.' 4 I call attention, however, to a pas-
sage toward the close of the majority opinion in which the Court all
but announced that it was guided not by the Lemon test but by a
materially less restrictive approach:
We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the
Bishop of Rome, or other powerful religious leaders behind every
public acknowledgment of the religious heritage long officially
recognized by the three constitutional branches of government.
Any notion that these symbols pose a real danger of establishment
of a state church is farfetched indeed.' 5
In light of Marsh, Lynch, and other indications 16 that a majority
of the Justices no longer viewed the Lemon test as the proper mea-
sure of establishment clause violations, the establishment clause de-
cisions of the Court's 1984-85 Term must be seen as representing
somewhat of a shift in direction. The Lemon test emerged from
these decisions not only intact in form but to some extent revitalized
in substance. Invoking the test, the Court invalidated a state mo-
ment-of-silence law,17 three publicly-financed programs offering re-
medial or enrichment classes to parochial school children in
13 Id. at 683.
14 See i. at 694-726 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 726-27 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); see also Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Buiger Court, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 1, 12-14
(1984); Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: lh- Jefferson 's Crumbling Wall-A Comment
on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE L.J. 770.
15 465 U.S. at 686.
16 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (5-4 decision upholding tax deduc-
tion for tuition and other expenses of parochial school education). lueller is discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 90-91.
17 Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Although the Court inJaffree invalidated
the Alabama moment-of-silence law under review, the decision did not cast doubt on the
validity of moment-of-silence laws generally. Indeed, quite the contrary. Most obvi-
ously, the majority rested its invalidation of the Alabama statute entirely on the statute's
specific history-one revealing, in the majority's view, that "the statute had no secular
purpose." Id. at 56 (emphasis in original). In addition, the majority appeared to suggest
in dictum that some moment-of-silence laws could withstand constitutional scrutiny. See
id. at 59 ("The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course, quite
different from merely protecting every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer dur-
ing an appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday."). Furthermore, two mem-
bers of the six-member majority were unequivocal in separate concurrences as to the
validity of some moment-of-silence laws, and the three dissenters seemed prepared to
approve virtually any moment-of-silence law. For the view that, in light of "the circum-
stances in which [current moment-of-silence] statutes were passed and the setting of the
public school classroom in which they take effect," these statutes "may violate all three
prongs of the [Lemon] test," see Note, The 'nconstitutionaliti' of State Statutes Authorizing
MVoments of Silence in the Public Schools, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1874 (1983).
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parochial school classrooms, 8 and a state law barring employers
from requiring employees to work on their Sabbath.' 9
In this Article I suggest that this reprieve for the Lemon test was
appropriate only if the test's requirements are substantially revised.
I propose various revisions that I believe are essential in terms of
two principal considerations: protection against the "three main
evils'' 2 ° recognized by the Court as central to a proper interpreta-
tion of the clause; and the need for a test that invites objective and
consistent application. In my view, these two considerations are not
only of independent importance but also intimately related, because
failure to minimize the extent to which judges are left to intuition in
applying the test is apt to undermine the protective functions of the
clause. Very simply, the promotion of religion is something that
most people-judges included-have difficulty seeing as bad. Not
only are most people taught by their parents and others to regard
religion itself as a good, but many if not most are also taught to
regard in similar fashion the spreading of one's religion to
nonbelievers. 21
I emphasize at the outset that my proposals are not intended to
yield a test that, fairly applied, reconciles the results in all or almost
all of the Court's establishment clause cases. Whether more atten-
tion to consistency in results with the decided cases would be appro-
priate is a matter about which reasonable persons may differ. I
invite the reader to consider, however, whether the results in these
cases are such that no coherent approach could hope to reconcile
them to a very high degree. 22
I
THE SECULAR PURPOSE REQUIREMENT
A. The Requisite Showing
The first prong of the Lemon test sets forth as a necessary condi-
tion for constitutionality that the law under review have a "secular
18 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985). 4
11) Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). The Court's one estab-
lishment clause decision of the 1985-86 Term, Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services
for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986), see infra text accompanying notes 108-09, cast no
doubt on the Court's current commitment to the Lemon test. The Justices were unani-
mous in recognizing that the Lemon test applied and that it required rejection of the
respondent's establishment clause challenge.
20 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
21 For insight into the attitudes toward religion of the individual Justices of the past
fifty years, see Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 83.
22 For suggestions to this effect, see Johnson, supra note 6; Kurland, supra note 6;
Note, Rebuilding the 1ail: The Case for a Return to the Strict Intepretation of the Establishment
Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1463 (1981).
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legislative purpose."'23 The Court has made clear that this require-
ment focuses on the actual purpose or purposes that motivated
adoption of the law. Although the Court has varied somewhat in its
statements elaborating on this requirement,24 it seems clear that,
unless a law is proven to be predicated entirely or almost entirely on
nonsecular purposes, this requirement is met.
This requirement is defensible to the extent that it recognizes
that a law adopted for reasons incompatible with the establishment
clause should be struck down even though the law would be unas-
sailable if adopted for valid reasons. As several commentators have
argued convincingly at length,25 the various provisions of the Con-
stitution are most reasonably interpreted to afford protection
against laws predicated on purposes implicitly prohibited by those
provisions. Although a number of objections have been raised to
invalidating laws for illicit motivation, 26 they have been shown to be
ultimately unpersuasive. 27
The first prong's secular purpose requirement is not defensible,
however, to the extent that it limits the protection afforded by the
establishment clause against illicitly motivated laws to laws predi-
cated entirely or almost entirely on nonsecular purposes. This limi-
tation is inconsistent with the basic rationale for invalidating illicitly
motivated laws-a rationale described by Professor Brest as follows:
1. Governments are constitutionally prohibited from pursu-
ing certain objectives-for example, the disadvantaging of a racial
group, the suppression of a religion, or the deterring of interstate
migration.
2. The fact that a decisionmaker gives weight to an illicit ob-
jective may determine the outcome of the decision. The decision-
making process consists of weighing the foreseeable and desirable
23 403 U.S. at 612.
24 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (a law must have "a clearly
secular purpose"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) ("The Court has invali-
dated legislation or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was lack-
ing, but only when it has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was
motivated wholly by religious considerations."); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41
(1980) (per curiam) (the "pre-eminent purpose" of a law must not be "plainly religious
in nature").
25 See, e.g., Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental
Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 (1978); Eisenberg, Disproportionate
Inpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977);
Ely, Legislative and Admitistrative Motivation in Constitutional Lazo, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
26 See Brest, supra note 25, at 119 (identifying four objections: "the difficulty of
ascertaining motivation, "the futility of invalidating an otherwise permissible law,"
"the disutility of invalidating what may otherwise be a perfectly good law," and "the
general impropriety of the inquiry").
27 See id. at 119-30; Ely, supra note 25, at 1212-23.
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consequences of the proposed decision against its foreseeable
costs. Considerations of distributive fairness play an important
role. To the extent that the decisionmaker is illicitly motivated, he
treats as a desirable consequence one to which the lawfully moti-
vated decisionmaker would be indifferent or which he would view
as undesirable.
3. Assuming that a person has no legitimate complaint
against a particular decision merely because it affects him ad-
versely, he does have a legitimate complaint if it would not have
been adopted but for the decisionmaker's consideration of illicit
objectives. If in fact the rule adopted is useful and fair, the ad-
versely affected party might have no legitimate grievance,
whatever considerations went into its adoption. In our govern-
mental system, however, only the political decisionmaker-and
not the judiciary-has general authority to assess the utility and
fairness of a decision. And, since the decisionmaker has (by hy-
pothesis) assigned an incorrect value to a relevant factor, the party
has been deprived of his only opportunity for a full, proper
assessment.2
8
In keeping with the above rationale, the Court should revise the
first prong of the Lemon test to require the invalidation of any law
that would not have been adopted if a nonsecular purpose had not
been considered. 2 9 The fact that such a purpose may not have been
the exclusive or even the primary one motivating adoption should
be seen as beside the point. In suggesting this revision of the first
prong, I note that I am hardly alone in accepting both the accuracy
28 Brest, supra note 25, at 116-17.
29 Under this formulation, proof of a nonsecular purpose does not necessarily re-
quire invalidation of the law: The law satisfies the first prong if its adoption did not
depend upon consideration of the impermissible purpose. Proof of a nonsecular pur-
pose should be treated, however, as a basis for shifting to the state the burden of show-
ing that adoption was not dependent on such a purpose. See Brest, supra note 25, at 117-
18:
If the decisionmaker gave weight to an illicit objective, the court should
presume that his consideration of the objective determined the outcome
of the decision and should invalidate the decision in the absence of clear
proof to the contrary. Evidence sufficient to establish that the deci-
sionmaker gave any weight to an illicit objective will also often establish
that the decision would not have been made but for the pursuit of that
objective. A complainant may, however, prove clearly and convincingly
that the decisionmaker gave weight to an illicit objective and yet fail to
establish with equal certainty that this affected the outcome of the deci-
sion. It is conceivable-though seldom likely-that the same decision
would have been made even in the absence of illicit motivation. In this
case, proof that the decisionnmaker took account of an illicit objective re-
buts whatever presumption of regularity otherwise attaches. For this rea-
son, and because of the constitutional interests at stake, the court should
place on the decisionmaker a heavy burden of proving that his illicit ob-
jective was not determinative of the outcome.
To similar effect, see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270 n.21 (1977).
910 Vol. 72:905
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of Professor Brest's rendition of the rationale for invalidating im-
permissibly motivated laws and the implications of this rationale for
laws only partly based on impermissible motives. In particular, sev-
eral years after handing down Lemon, the Court in an equal protec-
tion context cited the discussion by Professor Brest quoted above as
support for holding that a law should be struck down if the decision
to adopt it depended on a racially discriminatory purpose, regard-
less of whether such purpose was exclusive, primary, or
subordinate. 30
B. Nature of the Prohibited Purposes
Under the first prong of the Lemon test as set forth by the Court
or as revised in accordance with the above discussion, the question
arises as to what constitutes a nonsecular purpose. The Court gen-
erally has been content to define these purposes broadly as ones to
aid or inhibit religion. 31 In its 1985 decision invalidating a state mo-
ment-of-silence law for failure to pass the first prong of the Lemon
test, however, a majority of the Court subscribed to the narrower
definition of such purposes as ones to endorse or disapprove of
religion.32
Neither of these definitions of "nonsecular" is adequately tai-
lored to the function that the term is intended to serve: identifying
those purposes that the establishment clause prohibits the govern-
ment from seeking to effectuate. If, as the Court has maintained,
the establishment clause was adopted to afford protection against
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sov-
ereign in religious activity," 33 it should be interpreted as barring the
government from having as its purpose the realization of any of
these evils. Rather than define nonsecular purposes as ones to aid
or inhibit religion or ones to endorse or disapprove of religion, the
Court therefore should define them as ones to sponsor religion,
support religion with public funds, or involve the state actively in
religious activity. 34
30 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66 & n.12.
31 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963).
32 Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
33 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970), quoted in Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
34 As Dean Choper has observed, the Court "has never seriously discussed" the
meaning of the term "religion" in the first amendment. Choper, Defining "Religion " in the
First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 579. For discussion of the Court's few modest
attempts at defining the term, see id. at 587-91. Although difficult questions of the
meaning of "religion" may arise in establishment clause cases, they arise far more fre-
quently in free exercise clause cases, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to address
this definitional problem. For a sampling of the wide range of scholarly resolutions of
1987]
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If the Court adopts this proposed definition, it also should elab-
orate upon it in two respects. First, the Court should make explicit
that the prohibition on purposes to sponsor religion, like the ex-
isting "endorse or disapprove" definition, extends to both endorse-
ment and disapproval. Although endorsing religion is synonymous
with sponsoring it, disapproving of religion is not. From a func-
tional perspective, however, it makes little sense to differentiate be-
tween endorsement and disapproval in delineating the purposes
prohibited by the clause. Governmental endorsement of religion is
an evil because it sends a message to nonadherents that they should
revise their beliefs or practices and that, if they do not, they are not
full-fledged members of the political community.3 5 Governmental
disapproval of religion is objectionable for the same reason. In ad-
dition, consideration of the ultimate evil of an established religion
suggests similar treatment of governmental endorsement and disap-
proval. Although the religious establishments that existed histori-
cally may seem most memorable for their messages of governmental
approval of religion, they also included more than their share of
messages of governmental disapproval.3 6
the problem, including suggestions that "religion," which appears only once in the first
amendment ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof...."), be defined differently for the establishment
and free exercise clauses, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-6 (1978);
Choper, supra; Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Lau), 72 CALIF. L. REV.
753 (1984); Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion
Under the First Amendnent, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 (1978); Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978).
35 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); En-
gel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
36 It may be objected that this interpretation of the establishment clause fails to
take proper account of the presence of its companion provision, the free exercise clause.
According to one commentator, "there is a clear definitional distinction between the two
clauses. Government support for religion is an element of every establishment claim,
just as a burden or restriction on religion is an element of every free exercise claim."
Laycock, Toward a General Theoty of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations
and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1384 (1981). Under this view,
state disapproval of religion is a free exercise rather than an establishment clause con-
cern because it is a question of inhibition. Neither the language nor history of the
clauses, however, offers persuasive evidence that the framers intended all questions of
inhibition to be tested by the free exercise clause alone. Indeed, any such view of the
framers' intent is difficult to reconcile with the general understanding, see. e.g.. Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-55 (1985); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305
(1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 227 (Douglas, J., concurring); P. KI.tPER, supra
note 4, at 77; Merel, supra note 34, at 809-12; Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relation-
ship Between the "'Establishment" and "'Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 rEx. L. REV. 142. 196-98
(1963), that the two clauses are bonded by a core concern with protecting from govern-
mental inhibition people's freedom to decide for themselves matters of religion. To be
sure, the paradigmatic establishment clause problem is one that focuses on direct gov-
ernmental support of religion and involves indirect inhibition of nonadherents' religious
autonomy. My contention here, however, is simply that the clause is properly under-
stood also to address some problems that do not fit this mold. See id. at 150-51.
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Second, the Court should clarify the implications of the pro-
posed definition for various religion-related purposes. Most obvi-
ously, it should be made clear that, despite its nonsecular
component, a purpose to comply with the mandate of the free exer-
cise clause 37 is not nonsecular within the meaning of the first
prong.38 The Court has not treated such purposes as prohibited, 39
and the proposed definition does not require otherwise. As the
Court regularly has assumed,40 the establishment and free exercise
clauses are most sensibly interpreted as coexisting with one another:
One clause does not require what the other clause forbids. 4 1 Under
this view of the relationship between the two clauses-a view virtu-
ally compelled by their juxtaposition and common roots4 2 -a pur-
pose of complying with the free exercise clause cannot reasonably
be found to be incompatible with the establishment clause. Instead,
it stands apart from the types of purposes prohibited by the estab-
lishment clause as a distinct variety of purpose permissible under
the clause.
Assume, for example, that in response to the Court's free exer-
cise clause ruling in Wisconsin v. Yoder,43 a state exempts Amish chil-
dren who complete eighth grade from the state's requirement that
all children attend school until the age of sixteen. The state has a
ready answer to charges that its purpose is the impermissible one of
37 "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] ......
U.S. CONST. amend. I. For general discussion of the clause, see Clark, Guidelinesfor the
Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327 (1969); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablish-
iient, and Doctrinal Development (pt. 1), 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967); Marshall, Solving the
Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983).
38 In keeping with this suggestion, I also make the modest recommendation that
purposes prohibited or permitted by the establishment clause be characterized simply as
"prohibited" or "permissible" purposes rather than as "nonsecular'" or "secular" ones.
The exercise of deciding which religion-related purposes are "secular" within the mean-
ing of the clause is needlessly confusing and invites misapplication.
3) See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 n.22 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
40 See supra note 39.
41 This is not to deny that there are occasions on which the demands of the two
clauses are in apparent conflict. Indeed, there are, and commentators have taken an array
of views as to how the clauses should be interpreted to resolve any such tensions that
may arise. See, e.g., P. KURIAND, RELIGION AND THE LAX\W OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE
SUiREME COURT (1962); L. TRIBE, supra note 34, §§ 14-2 to -4; Choper. The Religion
Clauses of the First .4mendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673 (1980); Ga-
lanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: .1 Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217;
Moore, supra note 36; Schwartz, Ao Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause luhe, 77
YALE I.J. 692 (1968). This debate, however, is not over what to do when one clause
requires what the other clause forbids. Rather, it is over how to interpret the two clauses
so as to render their demands compatible. The absence of actual conflict is assumed.
42 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); P.
KUt\LAND, supra note 41, at 16-18; Moore, supra note 36, at 194.
4"3 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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sponsoring religion. It can defend the exemption in terms of a pur-
pose of complying with the mandate of the free exercise clause.
44
Similarly, if a state in response to Sherbert v. Verner45 awards unem-
ployment compensation benefits to a person unavailable for work
for religious reasons, it can easily avoid a charge that its purpose is
the prohibited one of using state funds to support religion. It can
rely upon a purpose of satisfying the demands of the free exercise
clause.
More problematic in terms of consistency with the establish-
ment clause are purposes to protect people's freedom to engage in
religious practices where such protection is not required by the free
exercise clause. Consider, for example, a law barring private em-
ployers from requiring any employee to work on his or her Sab-
bath.46 The state cannot claim that its purpose is simply to comply
with the free exercise clause because the clause is not a constraint
on nongovernmental employers. Assume, however, that the state
claims that its purpose is to protect employees' freedom to observe
their religion's Sabbath. On its own terms, this purpose is a pur-
pose of singling out for special treatment one religious practice
from among the many that employers may try to pressure employ-
ees not to observe. As such, this purpose inevitably entails a
message to employees and others that Sabbath observation is a reli-
gious practice more worthy of respect than others, which is the es-
sence of sponsorship.
Assume instead that the state attempts to defend the law by as-
serting the broader purpose of protecting employees' freedom to
engage in religious practices that they feel compelled to observe.
Again, I suggest that the purpose is one forbidden by the prohibi-
tion on purposes to sponsor religion. It singles out for favored
treatment religiously motivated actions from among those that em-
ployees may feel compelled to take and that employers may pressure
them not to take. It implicitly states that religious motivations count
for more than nonreligious ones and that religion is preferable to
nonreligion.
The above analysis does not imply that the state may not go
beyond the demands of the free exercise clause in protecting peo-
ple's freedom to engage in religious practices. It does imply, how-
44 If a state purports to be acting in accordance with the mandate of the free exer-
cise clause but the implications of the clause for the particular issue have not been set-
tled, a court must decide these implications before addressing the question of the
permissibility of the purpose tinder the establishment clause.
45 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
46 In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), the Court invalidated
a Connecticut law of this sort under the primary effect prong of the Lemon test. It did
not address the validity of the law under the first prong of the test.
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ever, that the state cannot act in this way without violating the
proposed first prong unless it can explain its actions in terms of a
purpose that does not implicitly express a preference for religion
generally, for a particular religion, or for a particular religious belief
or practice. Moreover, this analysis also has important implications
for the legitimacy of such actions under the second prong insofar as
that prong is properly revised to require scrutiny of the relationship
between means and end-a possibility that I explore below. 47
1I
IMPERMISSIBLE EFFECTS
A. The Range of Effects Adverse to the Clause
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, a law fails to survive
establishment clause review unless its "principal or primary effect
• ..neither advances nor inhibits religion." 48 An initial difficulty
with this formulation that the Court has not remedied by interpreta-
tion in the years since Lemon is its broad reference to advancements
and inhibitions of religion. In keeping with the reasons that
prompted adoption of the clause, effects adverse to the clause
should not be identified by reference to any general notions of what
constitutes an advancement or inhibition of religion. Rather, they
should be identified in terms of the "three main evils" that the
clause was designed to prevent. The Court therefore should ex-
pressly limit the scope of the second prong to effects of sponsoring
religion, supporting religion with public funds, or involving the
state actively in religious activity.
To help ensure consistent and objective decisionmaking and
the degree of protection against the "three main evils" that the
clause was intended to afford, I also suggest that the Court an-
nounce criteria along the following lines for deciding the existence
of any of these effects adverse to the clause. First, a law has an effect
of sponsoring religion if it either: communicates to nonadherents of
religion a preference on the part of the state that they adhere to
some religion; communicates to nonadherents of a particular reli-
gion, religious belief, or religious practice a preference on the part
of the state that they adhere to such religion, religious belief, or
religious practice; or communicates to adherents of a particular reli-
gion, religious belief, or religious practice a preference on the part
of the state that they abandon such religion, religious belief, or reli-
gious practice. Second, a law has an effect of supporting religion
with public funds if it authorizes an expenditure of public funds that
47 See infra Part II-B.
48 Lemion v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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benefits the operations of a religious institution or that increases the
likelihood that an individual will exercise freedom of choice in favor
of a religious alternative. Third, a law has an effect of involving the
state actively in religious activity if it interferes with the authority of
a religious group or organization to decide a matter of religious
doctrine.
The first of the above criteria focuses on the reasonable percep-
tion of persons who would feel pressured and alienated by the alleg-
edly sponsored message. In doing so, it builds on the assumption
that the framers' objection to laws sponsoring religion was aimed at
the pressure to conform and the sense of second-class citizenship
generated by such laws. 49 If people are to be protected from these
harms, the existence of sponsorship must be measured by the rea-
sonable perception of the persons who would experience them. To
determine the existence of sponsorship based on the reasonable
perception of "an objective observer" 50-someone apt to be less
sensitive to it-would insulate from constitutional scrutiny at least
some laws inflicting harms of the sort that the framers wished to
prevent. 5'
The second criterion recognizes two types of effects as effects of
supporting religion with public funds: an effect of benefiting reli-
gious institutions, and an effect of encouraging individuals to pur-
sue a religious course of action. In doing so, it implements the
assumption that the framers' objection to laws supporting religion
with public funds was based on a principle that it is wrong to exact
contributions from one person to support another's religion.52
Both of the effects recognized by this criterion are offensive in terms
of this principle.
The third criterion focuses on one type of state involvement in
religious activity-state involvement that to some extent displaces
the authority of a religious group or organization to decide which
doctrines it holds true. This criterion does not assume that this type
49 See supra note 35.
50 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (main-
taining that reference should be made to the perception of "an objective observer, ac-
quainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation" of the law under review).
51 With regard to the difficulties of an approach not focusing on the perception of
persons who would experience the harms, recall the Court's logic in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), in denying the relevance of black persons' perception of separate
but equal railroad accommodations:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to con-
sist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it.
Id. at 551.
52 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947), and sources cited therein.
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of state involvement was the only type to which the framers ob-
jected. Rather, it assumes that it was the only type to which they
objected other than involvement that sponsors religion or that sup-
ports religion with public funds-forms of involvement already
taken into account by the first two criteria. The history that pro-
vides the backdrop for the adoption of the establishment clause in-
cludes extreme examples of involvement of the sort identified by
this criterion. Perhaps the most notable is the British government's
introduction of the Book of Common Prayer, which described in de-
tail for use in the established Church of England the proper form
and content of religious ceremonies. 53 Governmental action today,
however, rarely implicates this criterion. Basically, the criterion
comes into play as a constraint on the manner in which courts may
resolve internal church disputes brought before them: To the extent
that the resolution of such disputes depends upon a matter of reli-
gious doctrine, this criterion casts doubt on the validity of any at-
tempt by the judiciary to inject its own notions of proper doctrine.54
Because of this limited significance to modern establishment clause
problems, this criterion is discussed only briefly in the pages that
follow.
B. The Primary Effect Distinction
In providing that laws may be invalidated for effects adverse to
the clause, the Court in Lemon was careful to indicate that courts
should not strike down every law having such an effect. It limited
invalidation for adverse effects to laws having such an effect as their
"principal" or "primary" one.
Not long after handing down Lemon, the Court in Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist 55 significantly elaborated upon this pri-
mary effect distinction. First, the Court made clear that its use of
"primary" should not be taken literally. It denied that the distinc-
tion required courts to ascertain whether a particular effect adverse
to the clause actually is a law's primary one. Writing for the major-
ity in Nyquist, Justice Powell maintained:
We do not think that such metaphysical judgments are either pos-
sible or necessary. Our cases simply do not support the notion
that a law found to have a "primary" effect to promote some legit-
53 The Acts of Parliament approving the Book at its inception were 2 & 3 Edw. 6,
ch. I (1548), and 3 & 4 Edw. 6, ch. 10 (1549). The subsequent history of the Book-a
turbulent history that included various revisions, demises, and revivals-is describcd
briefly in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425-27 (1962), and at length in L. PuI.,[\N, THE
HISTORY OF THE BooK OF COMMON PRAYER (1900).
54 See generally Ellman, Driven fiom the Tribunal: Judicial Resohtion of Internal Chur'ch
Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1378 (1981).
55 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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imate end under the State's police power is immune from further
examination. 56
Second, the Court interpreted the distinction as requiring the invali-
dation of any law having an effect adverse to the clause that is "di-
rect and substantial" as opposed to "remote and incidental." '57
In subsequent years, the Court has frequently either cited the
Nquist interpretation of "primary effect" as authoritative 58 or sim-
ply reiterated its terms.59 This interpretation of "primary effect,"
however, is too vague and confusing to provide an adequate basis
for objective and consistent decisionmaking. The possibility for
confusion inheres in its contrast of "direct and substantial" effects
with "remote and incidental" ones. Presumably, the Court intended
these words to identify opposite ends of two separate spectrums;
otherwise the contrast makes little sense. As labels for opposite
ends of two separate spectrums, however, these words are excep-
tionally poor choices. Rather than two spectrums, the words give
the impression of three or four. Subsequent cases occasionally rem-
edy this problem to some extent by characterizing permissible ef-
fects as "indirect and incidental" rather than "remote and
incidental"; 60 and Nyquist itself speaks of "indirect and incidental"
effects at places in the opinion outside of the discussion addressed
to the meaning of "primary effect." 6' By speaking in terms of "di-
rect and substantial" effects versus "indirect and insubstantial"
ones, the Court could remedy this problem entirely.
If the Court's dichotomy in AVyquist is so understood, two signifi-
cant problems of vagueness in the Nyquist interpretation come to the
fore. First, it is unclear what directness means in this context. The
term is not expressly defined in Nyquist nor in any of the Court's
later decisions. Second, it is unclear how courts should respond to
effects that are direct and insubstantial or substantial and indirect.
Nyquist does not specify the status of such effects, and none of the
Court's subsequent cases offers ready insight into the matter by
characterizing a particular effect as direct and insubstantial or as
substantial and indirect.
As to the first of these vagueness problems, a discussion of pri-
mary effect in Sloan v. Lemon, '2 a companion case to Nyquist, strongly
56 Id. at 783-84 n.39.
57 Id. at 784-85 n.39.
58 See. e.g.. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1985); Meek v.
Pittengcr, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975).
51) See, e.g., Estate of Ihornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985): Wolnan v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229. 250 (1977).
(0 See, e.g., Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 394; Aleek,, 421 U.S. at 364.
(1 Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775. 793 (1973).
62 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
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suggests that the Court uses "direct" in this context to mean "in-
tended." The Court in Sloan, as in Nyquist, invalidated a program
providing tuition reimbursement to parents of parochial school stu-
dents. In finding that the program had a primary effect of advancing
religion, Justice Powell, the author of the Court's opinion in both
Sloan and Nyquist, explained:
The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special eco-
nomic benefit. Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition
subsidy, as an incentive to parents to send their children to sectar-
ian schools, or as a reward for having done so, at bottom its in-
tended consequence is to preserve and support religion-oriented
institutions. We think it plain that this is quite unlike the sort of
"indirect" and "incidental" benefits that flowed to sectarian
schools from programs aiding all parents by supplying bus trans-
portation and secular textbooks for their children. 63
The Court's determinations in Nyquist, 64 Sloan,65 and other
cases66 that aid given directly to parents of parochial school stu-
dents or to the students themselves had a "direct" effect of support-
ing the parochial schools tend to confirm that the Court generally
equates "direct" in this context with "intended." They do so by
apparently eliminating as a plausible interpretation of "direct" the
principal competition to "intended"-i.e., an interpretation refer-
ring to proximity or immediacy in space or time.
Also significant as confirmation of the proposed interpretation
is its value in helping to reconcile the Court's various announce-
ments in cases since Nyquist that an effect is or is not "direct." Con-
sider, for example, the Court's conclusion in Wolman v. Walter 67 that
state funding of transportation for parochial school field trips had a
"direct" effect of supporting religion 68 and its conclusion in Wolman
and Meek v. Pittenger69 that state funding of speech and hearing diag-
nostic services to be provided in parochial schools did not.70 The
different conclusions may be understood as reflecting different per-
ceptions on the part of the Court as to the real intent behind the
laws. In funding for parochial school students field trip transporta-
tion of the kind already provided for public school students, the
state in Wolman arguably was seeking to do no more than provide for
the educational enrichment of all the children of the state. The
653 Id. at 832.
64 413 U.S. at 780-83.
65 413 U.S. at 830-32.
66 See Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 395-96; [olman, 433 U.S. at 248-51.
67 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
68 Id. at 252-55.
69 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
70 433 U.S. at 241-44; 421 U.S. at 371 n.21.
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Court, however, apparently saw the state's action in a different light.
In its view, the state's real purpose was to provide financial support
for religion: to relieve parochial schools that already offered such
trips of a cost of operation; and to help parochial schools that did
not already offer such trips make themselves more attractive to par-
ents contemplating sending their children to parochial school.
Although the funding of diagnostic services in parochial schools
could also be seen as an attempt to support religion with public
funds, the Court apparently did not so regard it. In the Court's
view, the state in providing in parochial schools these diagnostic
services available in public schools was simply seeking to promote
the welfare of all children in the state.
With regard to the second problem of vagueness noted above,
the Court's applications of the primary effect distinction indicate
that it interprets the distinction as permitting laws with a substantial
and indirect effect adverse to the clause. The Court's willingness to
uphold laws that in its view have a substantial and unintended effect
adverse to the clause is exemplified by its approval of states' provid-
ing funds for the delivery in parochial schools of various types of
basic health care offered free of charge in the states' public
schools. 71 Such funding has an effect of supporting parochial
schools with public monies that cannot fairly be called insubstantial.
To the extent that the funding provides for health care that the
school would purchase itself, it diminishes the school's operating
expenses. To the extent that it provides for additional health care,
it enhances the school's attractiveness to parents contemplating
sending their children there.
The Court in Ieek v. Pittenger characterized the adverse effect of
this funding as "indirect and incidental."' 72 So doing, the Court at
least arguably indicated that it regarded the effect as both unin-
tended and insubstantial. The Court's remarks in Meek in support of
this characterization, however, strongly suggest that its sole concern
was the unintended nature of the adverse effect and that it was using
"incidental"-an uncommonly vague term that may mean "unin-
tended" as well as "insubstantial"--simply to emphasize the notion
of lack of intent. On the one hand, the Court made no reference to
substantiality of effect. On the other hand, it called attention to fac-
tors indicative of lack of any intent to support religion: Funding of
this sort is "part of general legislation made available to all stu-
dents" and provides for "secular and nonideological services unre-
lated to the primary, religion-oriented educational function of the
71 See l'ohnan, 433 U.S. at 242 & n.10: Meek, 421 U.S. at 364-65.
72 421 U.S. at 364.
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sectarian school." 73 Tacitly, then, the Court in Aeek appeared to be
saying that this funding was intended to provide for students'
health, not to finance religion, and that this disposed of the question
of an impermissible primary effect.
Also illustrative of the Court's receptivity to laws having an ef-
fect adverse to the clause that it regards as substantial and indirect is
its affirmation on a number of occasions that the establishment
clause does not bar municipalities from providing fire protection for
religious institutions."4 Again, the substantiality of the effect of sup-
porting religion with public funds is evident. By providing this ser-
vice, a municipality relieves religious institutions of a material
operating expense. If the municipality did not provide this service,
the institutions would be forced to secure protection of this sort on
their own.
Here, too, the Court has not expressly confirmed or denied the
substantiality of the effect. Moreover, the apparent reason for its
inattention to the matter again appears to be a perception that the
effect is unintended. According to the Court in Nyquist, municipal
provision of this service has an "indirect and incidental" effect of
supporting religion. In its view, this service, "provided in common
to all citizens, [is] 'so separate and so indisputably marked off from
the religious function' that [it] may fairly be viewed as reflect[ing] a
neutral posture toward religious institutions. ' 75 In short, from the
Court's perspective, a municipality's intent in providing religious in-
stitutions with fire protection is not to support them with public
funds but rather to safeguard persons and property, and this intent
validates the effect of supporting religion, however substantial such
effect may be.
The Court's approach to laws having an effect adverse to the
clause that it regards as insubstantial and direct is more difficult to
ascertain. The first prong of the Lemon test seems to commit the
Court to the view that courts should invalidate a law having an ad-
verse effect that is insubstantial but paradigmatically "direct": If a
law has an adverse effect that is reasonably explicable only in terms
of the illicit intent to achieve it, the first prong appears to require
invalidating the law regardless of the substantiality of this effect. It
is not clear, however, where the Court stands as to laws having an
adverse effect that is insubstantial and intended but not so obviously
intended as to run afoul of the first prong. Not only are there no
cases in which the Court in applying the second prong characterized
73 Id.
74 See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781-82 (1973); Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
75 413 U.S. at 781-82 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 18).
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the effect in question as insubstantial and direct; it is difficult to
point with confidence to any particular case as one in which the
Court in applying the second prong must have recognized the effect
as insubstantial and direct. 76 For reasons set forth below, I doubt
that the Court gives serious consideration under the second prong
to any effect that it regards as insubstantial.
Basically, I suggest that the primary effect distinction is best un-
derstood as stating a requirement relevant to laws having a substan-
tial effect adverse to the clause: A law must not have a substantial
effect adverse to the clause unless the effect is obviously unin-
tended. In making this suggestion, I rely on the preceding analysis
of the Court's application of the primary effect distinction but also
on what I perceive to be the logic underlying the Court's attention
under the second prong to whether or not an effect adverse to the
clause is intended. According to the Court in Lemon, the establish-
ment clause's prohibition on laws "respecting an establishment of
religion" encompasses any law that constitutes a "step that could
lead" 77 to an established religion. I suggest that the Court at least
intuitively is operating on a theory of the establishment clause that
assumes that the only type of law that constitutes a tangible "step
that could lead" to an established religion is one predicated on an
intent to bring about one of the evils that the clause was designed to
prevent. If the Court indeed is operating under this theory of the
clause, it makes a great deal of sense for it to go beyond the require-
ments of the first prong in taking illicit intent into account. Whether
applied as the Court currently applies it or as I propose in this Arti-
cle, 78 the first prong only requires the invalidation of laws that chal-
lengers have borne the difficult burden of proving rest on an intent
to achieve an effect adverse to the clause. It leaves standing laws
that, though not proven to rest on illicit intent, in fact were moti-
vated by such intent. A reasonable way of weeding out these less
apparent but tangible "step[s] that could lead" to an established
religion is to attach a presumption of unconstitutionality to laws that
there is good reason to suspect are based on illicit motives. If one
may assume that a law that achieves a substantial effect of a certain
kind probably was intended to achieve that effect, laws having a sub-
76 On the one hand, although there are some cases in which the Court expressly
acknowledged the existence of a direct effect and did not specify whether or not it was
substantial, none of these cases appears to involve an effect so plainly insubstantial that
the Court must have tacitly recognized it as such. On the other hand, as the Court's
practice of using the terms "incidental" and "remote," rather than "insubstantial," vir-
tually ensures, there appear to be no cases in which the Court expressly acknowledged
the existence of an insubstantial effect and did not specify whether or not it was direct.
77 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
78 See supra Part I-A.
922 [Vol. 72:905
ESTABLISHIVENT CLA USE
stantial effect adverse to the clause are plainly laws of this descrip-
tion. Unless the suspicion of illicit intent aroused by their
substantial adverse effect is dispelled by evidence negating such in-
tent-that is, unless the substantial effect is obviously unintended-
these laws therefore should be struck down.79
Although an exception for "obviously unintended" substantial
effects may reflect a sound interpretation of the establishment
clause, it undoubtedly leaves something to be desired as a basis for
objective and consistent application. With this in mind, I suggest
that a substantial effect adverse to the clause should be regarded as
"obviously unintended" if the law having such effect is necessary to
serve a substantial governmental interest. A law would meet this
description if it serves an interest of material importance to the gen-
eral welfare more precisely than any alternative means that is both
less drastic in terms of effects adverse to the establishment clause
and not beyond the state's capacity to implement. 80 This suggestion
reflects the assumption that there is no good reason to suspect that
a law is designed to serve an unlawful objective if it is the best avail-'
able means of serving a lawful objective worthy of serious attention.
C. The Alternative Formulation
Based on the preceding analysis, I therefore propose that the
Court revise the second prong of the Lemon test to state the follow-
ing requirement:
A law must not have a substantial effect adverse to the clause
unless the law is necessary to serve a substantial governmental
interest.
In addition, drawing on the criteria suggested earlier for deciding
the existence of an effect adverse to the clause, I recommend that, if
the Court adopts this requirement, it provide an explanation along
the following lines as to the type of effect that qualifies as a substan-
tial one adverse to the clause:
79 For an approach that shares this view of illicit intent as central to an interpreta-
tion of the clause but that does not attach any presumption of illicit intent on the basis of
effects, see P. KURLAND, sutpra note 41. Professor Kurland's basic thesis-that the estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses "should be read as a single precept that government
cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses prohibit
classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden." id. at
18-is critically examined in Merel, supra note 34, at 807-09; Kauper, Book Review, 41
Tx. L. REv. 467 (1963); Pfefltr, Book Review, 15 STAN. L. Rrv. 389 (1963).
80 The latter qualification, "not beyond the state's capacity to implement," is in-
tended to remove from consideration means prohibited to the state by federal con-
straints other than the establishment clause and means that the state could not adopt
without impairing severely its ability to function effectively. See Simson, .1 Method for
AiIalyhig Discriminalory Effects U nder the Equal Protection Clause, 29 S'rTAN. L. REv. 663, 679-
80, 687 n.121 (1977).
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A law has an effect adverse to the clause if it has an effect of
sponsoring religion, supporting religion with public funds, or in-
volving the state actively in religious activity. A law has a substan-
tial effect of sponsoring religion if it either: communicates to
nonadherents of religion a material preference on the part of the
state that they adhere to some religion; communicates to
nonadherents of a particular religion, religious belief, or religious
practice a material preference on the part of the state that they
adhere to such religion, religious belief, or religious practice; or
communicates to adherents of a particular religion, religious be-
lief, or religious practice a material preference on the part of the
state that they abandon such religion, religious belief, or religious
practice. A law has a substantial effect of supporting religion with
public funds if it authorizes an expenditure of public funds that
materially benefits the operations of a religious institution or that
materially increases the likelihood that an individual will exercise
freedom of choice in favor of a religious alternative. A law has a
substantial effect of involving the state actively in religious activity
if it materially interferes with the authority of a religious group or
organization to decide a matter of religious doctrine.
There can be little question that this alternative formulation of
the second prong generally requires less tolerance for laws having
an effect adverse to the clause than the Court has displayed in the
past. Analysis of the laws upheld by the Court in Board of Education
v. Allen 8 l and Mueller v. Allen 8 2 illustrates the lesser tolerance re-
quired for laws having an effect of supporting religion with public
funds.
The state law sustained in Board of Education v. Allen requires
local school boards to purchase and loan to parochial school stu-
dents nonreligious books for use in their courses. The law has a
substantial effect of supporting religion with public funds regardless
of whether the parochial school in which the books are used previ-
ously purchased the books for the students or required the students'
parents to purchase them.83 On the one hand, if the school previ-
ously purchased the books, the law materially benefits the school by
relieving it of a nontrivial operating expense. On the other hand, if
the parents previously purchased the books, the law, by relieving the
parents of a nontrivial expense of educating their children outside
the public schools, materially increases the likelihood that parents
81 392 U.S. 236 (1968). For a thoughtful comment on Board of Education v. Allen in
particular and parochial school aid in general, see Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969).
82 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
83 With regard to the practices of the schools in the districts involved in the instant
litigation, see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. at 244 n.6.
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contemplating sending their children to parochial schools will opt to
do so.
Under the proposed approach, the law is therefore unconstitu-
tional unless it is necessary to serve a substantial state interest. The
state's interest in ensuring that the children of the state are edu-
cated in secular subjects with books of good quality is undoubtedly
substantial: The state's interest in providing the children of the state
with a good secular education is an interest of the highest order, and
few persons would deny that a basic prerequisite to a good secular
education is good textbooks. The textbook loan program is not
necessary to serve this substantial interest, however-and therefore
must fall-because the state need not be the one to supply the
books. The interest is served with equal precision by the less drastic
means of requiring parochial schools, as a condition for licensing by
the state, to purchase or require parents to purchase secular text-
books that are conducive to quality education.
To be sure, if this requirement imposed an unreasonable bur-
den on parochial schools' ability to remain solvent or to perform
their religious function effectively, Pierce v. Society of Sisterss4 would
eliminate it as an available less drastic means. Relying on the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause,8 5 the Court in Pierce held
that states must allow parents to satisfy compulsory education laws
by sending their children to nonpublic schools licensed by the state.
As the Court tacitly suggested in Pierce8 6 and made explicit soon af-
ter,8 7 states interfere impermissibly with the parental right recog-
nized in Pierce insofar as they prescribe licensing requirements that
unreasonably burden nonpublic schools' operation.88 A require-
84 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
85 "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
86 268 U.S. at 534 ("No question is raised concerning the power of the State reason-
ably to regulate all schools .... ") (emphasis added).
87 See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1927).
88 Pierce was one of the many substantive due process decisions handed down by the
Court during the heyday of the discredited substantive due process of the Lochiner era.
See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 11.3 (3d ed.
1986). On various occasions since its repudiation in the late 1930's of Lochiner-style sub-
stantive due process, however, the Court has reaffirmed its allegiance to the holding in
Pierce, see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-83 (1965); Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945), though citing Pierce at times as a first amendment case,
see, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Thomas, 323 U.S. 516. In addition, in Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973), the Court indicated that, as regards paro-
chial schools, the holding in Pierce is required by the free exercise clause. See also Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (strongly intimating this view).
I regard Pierce as readily defensible under the free exercise clause insofar as it con-
cerns parochial schools. On the one hand, a refusal by the state to allow parents to
satisfy compulsory education laws by sending their children to parochial school signifi-
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ment to furnish or require parents to furnish textbooks of proper
quality, however, cannot sensibly be characterized as an unreasona-
ble burden on parochial schools. This requirement, like one to hire
teachers competent to teach the required secular education subjects
or one to provide adequate heating and ventilation in the class-
rooms, is a natural burden of the parochial school enterprise-a sine
qua non to the educational endeavor that the parochial school pur-
ports to be undertaking. Pierce therefore does not arguably bar im-
posing the requirement on the schools.
The law upheld in Mueller v. Allen allows parents of elementary
and secondary school students a state income tax deduction of $500
or $700 (depending on the child's grade) for expenses incurred for
tuition, textbooks, and transportation. By virtue of its applicability
to parents of parochial school students, 89 the law has a substantial
effect of supporting religion with public funds. Although a tax de-
duction is not an expenditure of public funds in form, it plainly is so
in fact. Moreover, by relieving parents of a tangible part of the cost
of educating their children in parochial school, this deduction mate-
rially increases the likelihood that parents contemplating sending
their children to parochial school will decide to do so.
Like the aid to parochial education in Board of Education v. Allen,
this aid therefore must be necessary to serve a substantial state in-
terest in order to survive review under the proposed approach. Also
like the aid in Board of Education v. Allen, this aid does not satisfy this
demand. The Court in Mueller recognized two interests of material
importance to the general welfare served by allowing parents of pa-
rochial school students to take this tax deduction: (1) ensuring that
the people of the state are well-educated; and (2) keeping within
reasonable bounds the cost to taxpayers of providing everyone with
cantly interferes with parents' free exercise of religion. It prevents them from educating
their children in an environment in which the inculcation of religious values is the para-
mount objective and in which instruction in secular subjects is informed by these values.
On the other hand, although the state has a powerful interest in the proper education of
the young, it has little justification for serving this interest by requiring attendance at
public rather than parochial school. It can serve the interest adequately by the less dras-
tic means of regulating parochial schools with regard to minimum hours of instruction
in secular subjects, minimum qualifications for instructors of secular subjects, and the
like. For present purposes, I assume no more than that Pierce is correctly decided as it
pertains to parochial schools.
8 ) The principal beneficiaries of the law plainly are parents of parochial school stu-
dents. Though applicable by its terms to parents of public school students, this Minne-
sota statute generally has little significance fbr such parents because, with rare
exception, they pay no tuition and have no substantial deductible expenses of any other
sort. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 408-09 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In
addition, although parents of children attending private nonreligious school are able to
take advantage of the law as much as parents of parochial school students, the number
of children in Minnesota attending parochial school appears to be approximately twenty
times greater than the number attending private nonreligious school. See id. at 391.
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a good education.90 The tax deduction for parochial education
bears virtually no relation to the first of these interests. It encour-
ages parents contemplating sending their children to parochial
school to do so, but this has nothing to do with ensuring a well-
educated populace. If parents do not receive this encouragement,
they may decide not to send their children to parochial school.
However, they will not-indeed, they cannot-decide not to provide
for their children's proper education. They will so provide simply
by sending them to public school.
The tax deduction for parochial education bears a closer rela-
tionship to the second interest, but not arguably a necessary one.
By encouraging parents to send their children to parochial school,
the tax deduction reduces the costs to the state of educating its pop-
ulation. It is not clear, however, that the state could not achieve
similar savings by a combination of various economizing measures
having no effects adverse to the establishment clause. Moreover,
even assuming that alternative means would not achieve this result,
it is dubious that the deduction is necessary to serve the state's in-
terest in keeping its education bill within reasonable bounds. If, as
the Court has maintained, "education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments," 91 the term "reasonable
bounds" sensibly must be understood in a very unrestrictive way.
Analysis of the laws sustained by the Court in Zorach v. Clauson92
and Marsh v. Chambers93 makes clear that the proposed approach
also requires the Court to be less tolerant than it has been in the
past of laws having an effect of sponsoring religion. Zorach involved
a city's "released time" program for its public schools. Under this
program, a school sets aside one hour of classroom time every week
to allow students who wish to attend religious centers for religious
training to do so. During this hour, the students who elect not to
attend a religious center are not free to leave the school, and classes
are essentially suspended so that the absent students do not fall
behind.94
The program in Zorach has a substantial effect of sponsoring
90 463 U.S. at 395.
91 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 222 (1982) ("What we said 28 years ago in [Brown] still holds true: 'Today,
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.' ").
92 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
93 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
94 Several years prior to Zorach, the Court invalidated a released-time program in
which the optional religious training was offered in the public school classrooms by in-
structors from religious centers. Illinois cc rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948). For insight into the interactions among thejustices in Zorach and Me1CCollum,
see Note, The "Released Time" Cases Revisited: A Study of Group Decisionmaking by the Supreme
Court, 83 YALE LJ. 1202 (1974).
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religion because students who do not adhere to any religion or who
do not wish to receive any formal religious training reasonably
would perceive of it as expressing a material preference on the part
of the government that they adhere to a religion and receive such
training.' 5 Furthermore, the program lacks the necessary relation-
ship to a substantial state interest that the proposed approach de-
mands of any law having such an effect. In his opinion for the Court
in Zorach-an opinion containing the rather startling assertion that
"[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being" 96 -Justice Douglas characterized the challenged
program as a means to "accommodate the religious needs" 97 of the
students. As stated, however, this interest of accommodating the
students' religious needs does not arguably provide a basis for sus-
taining the program, because it is an illicit interest of sponsoring
religion. By singling out only the students' religious needs as wor-
thy of accommodation, it amounts to a statement that the demands
of religion are entitled to special respect. As such, it implies a pref-
erence on the part of the state for religion over nonreligion.
The program in Zorach may be defended somewhat more plausi-
bly as a means of serving the broader interest of accommodating
students' strongly felt needs. This interest is legitimate and, no
doubt, substantial. It is inconceivable, however, that the released
time program is necessary to serve it. First of all, unless the school
accommodates the students' various strongly felt needs, the pro-
gram is grossly underinclusive in serving this interest. Second, even
if the school is responsive to a wide range of needs, the program is
not essential to accommodate the particular need of attending reli-
gious centers for religious training. There are more than enough
hours in the week when school is not in session for students to sat-
isfy this need. Finally, assuming for purposes of argument that the
school week does encroach upon the time needed for religious
training, the released time program would still be an unnecessary
form of religious sponsorship. The schools could accommodate the
students' need for adequate time at religious centers by the less
drastic means of shortening the school day and releasing all stu-
dents at an earlier time. '18
As discussed earlier,' 9 Marsh v. Chambers involved a state's prac-
95 See Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: .A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN.
L. REV. 329, 388-91 (1963).
96 343 U.S. at 313.
97 Id. at 315.
98 See id. at 324 (Jackson, J., dissenting). For a defense of Zorach in terms of an
"expanded notion of free exercise neutrality," see Giannella, Religious Liberty. Nonestab-
lishnient, and Doctrinal Development (pt. 2), 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 570-72 (1968).
99 See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
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tice of opening its legislative sessions with prayer. Like the program
in Zorach, this practice has a substantial effect of sponsoring religion.
Legislators who do not share the beliefs articulated in a particular
prayer, or who do not believe in the value of prayer or in praying in
a forum so public and nonreligious in nature as a legislative cham-
ber, reasonably would perceive of the practice as expressing a mate-
rial preference on the part of the state that they join in such prayer
and embrace the articulated beliefs.
Also like the program in Zorach, this practice is unconstitutional
under the proposed approach for want of a necessary relationship to
a substantial state interest. Legislative prayer bears some relation-
ship to the state's substantial interest in ensuring that legislators ap-
proach their responsibility to provide for the general welfare with
seriousness and integrity. That it bears a necessary relationship to
this interest, however, is not even arguable. On the one hand, legis-
lative prayer does little to ensure that legislators approach their re-
sponsibility in this way. It is actually a detriment in this respect for
legislators offended by such prayer, because it distracts them from
the task at hand. As to other legislators, legislative prayer may have
some uplifting effect but none likely to influence materially their
performance inside or outside the legislative chamber. On the
other hand, whatever contribution legislative prayer may make to
ensuring that legislators act with due regard for their task is
matched or exceeded by various other means-e.g., reading aloud
excerpts from great documents in American history-having no ef-
fects adverse to the clause.' 00
Although the proposed standard requires the Court to be less
tolerant than in the past of laws having an effect adverse to the
clause, I emphasize that it hardly requires the rejection of all laws
having such an effect. It accommodates laws with an insubstantial
adverse effect and laws that have a substantial adverse effect but that
are necessary to serve a substantial state interest.
Examples of laws having an insubstantial adverse effect are the
Sunday closing legislation upheld in McGowan v. Matyland 1"1 and
the state funding of speech and hearing diagnostic services in paro-
chial schools approved in M1leek v. Pitteniger10 2 and WJolman v. 117al-
ter. ' 3 The Sunday closing legislation in McGowan has an effect of
100 According to Justice Brennan, "[Wlhatever secular functions legislative prayer
might play ... could so plainly be performed in a purely nonreligious fashion that to
claim a secular purpose for the prayer is an insult to the perfectly honorable individuals
who instituted and continue the practice." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 797-98
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
102 421 U.S. 349, 371 n.21 (1975).
103 433 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1977).
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sponsoring religion because non-Christians reasonably would per-
ceive of it as expressing a preference on the part of the state that
they belong to a Christian sect and attend church on Sundays. The
effect is insubstantial, however, because the legislation is so riddled
with exceptions for activities of a nonreligious nature 0 4 that the
preference reasonably perceived by non-Christians is a very weak
one. Similarly, the funding of speech and hearing diagnostic serv-
ices has an effect of supporting religion with public funds because it
makes parochial schools more attractive to parents contemplating
sending their children there. The effect is insubstantial, however,
because the services funded enhance the appeal of parochial schools
only minimally.
Municipal fire protection for religious institutions, approved by
the Court in Nyquist and elsewhere, 10 5 offers an obvious example of
governmental action having a substantial adverse effect but neces-
sary to serve a substantial state interest. Provision of this service has
a substantial effect of supporting religion with public funds because,
as discussed earlier, ' 0 6 it relieves religious institutions of a material
operating expense. It is necessary, however, to serve the state's sub-
stantial interest in protecting persons and property from the de-
struction wrought by fire. In the abstract, it may seem that the
government is obliged to adopt as a less drastic means a require-
ment that religious institutions, as a condition for remaining open
to students or the general public, make appropriate provision for
fire protection. 10 7 This requirement may be seen as nothing more
than an insistence that the institutions bear a natural burden of op-
eration. Under existing circumstances, however, the imposition of
this requirement would be an unreasonable burden on religious in-
stitutions-a burden far in excess of any natural one that may exist.
By essentially taking over the business of fire protection, local gov-
ernment has made it immeasurably more difficult and expensive for
religious institutions to secure adequate protection of this sort on
their own.
Another, less routine, example of governmental action having a
substantial adverse effect but necessary to serve a substantial state
interest is the financial aid found permissible in lVitters v. J'ashing'ton
104 Among the activities permitted in all or part of the state for all or part of the day
are the sale of tobacco and alcoholic beverages, the operation of beaches and amuse-
ment parks, and stock car racing. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422-24, 448
(1961).
105 See supra note 74.
106 See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
107 Compare the analysis of Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). supra at
text accompanying notes 83-88.
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Department of Services for the Blind.108 The financial aid at issue in Wit-
ters was aid that an individual sought under the state's vocational
rehabilitation assistance program for the blind. This aid, which a
state agency denied to avoid a perceived establishment clause viola-
tion, was to be used to finance the recipient's training at a Christian
college to become a pastor, missionary, or church youth director.
The availability of such aid would have a substantial effect of
supporting religion with public funds because it would increase ma-
terially the likelihood that a person inclined to pursue such religious
training would do so. The aid is permissible under the proposed
standard, however, because it would bear a necessary relationship to
a substantial state interest. The state has an interest of obvious im-
portance in enabling blind persons to achieve, in the words of the
statute creating the aid program, "the maximum degree of self-sup-
port and self-care."' 0 9 Furthermore, due to a combination of fac-
tors, the aid in question would be necessary to serve this interest.
First, although state funding of vocational training costs for blind
persons may not serve this interest with complete precision, it prob-
ably serves it as precisely as possible in light of the inherent difficul-
ties of serving an interest of this sort. Second, this funding is
considerably more likely to achieve the desired result if aid recipi-
ents can apply it to training for the vocation that they prefer to pur-
sue. Very simply, even with the assistance provided by the state,
blind persons must overcome formidable obstacles to equip them-
selves properly for a vocation. It is essential that their task not be
made any more difficult by requiring that, as a condition of receiving
this assistance, they pursue a vocation other than the one to which
they are most committed.
State funding of basic health care in parochial schools, acknowl-
edged by the Court as valid, l1 offers an interesting example of gov-
ernmental action that falls neither entirely within nor entirely
without the category of laws having a substantial adverse effect but
necessary to serve a substantial state interest. As previously dis-
cussed,"' this funding of health care of the sort made available in
the state's public schools has a substantial effect of supporting reli-
gion with public funds. It also plainly serves the state's substantial
interest in ensuring a certain minimum level of health care for all
children. Whether it serves this interest with the requisite necessary
relationship, however, depends upon the type of health care that it
purchases.
108 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986).
109 WASH. REV. CODE. § 74.16.181 (1981).
1 10 See supra note 71.
III See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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On the one hand, to the extent that the funding goes to provide
for the type of nursing care that sensibly must be readily available
on premises in an institution housing large numbers of children for
much of the day, this necessary nexus does not exist. The state's
interest is served equally well by requiring the schools to furnish
such care, and this alternative is available to the state because the
provision of this care is properly seen as a natural burden of operat-
ing the schools.
On the other hand, to the extent that the funding goes to pro-
vide health care not designed simply to respond to the events of the
day at the school, the requisite necessary relationship appears to ex-
ist. First, it is dubious that all or even almost all children will actu-
ally receive the care unless it is brought to them at the school.
Second, although a requirement that the parochial schools fund
such care themselves would serve the state's interest equally well,
this alternative is not open to the state. Such care is plainly not
mandated by the nature of the parochial school endeavor. For the
state to impose this requirement therefore would unreasonably bur-
den the schools' operation.
III
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT
The third and final prong of the Lemon test provides that the law
under review "must not foster 'an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.' "112 The Court's understanding of this require-
ment is illustrated by the way in which the Court applied it in Lemon
to a state law funding salary supplements for teachers of secular
subjects in parochial schools. In invalidating the law under the
Lemon test's third prong, the Court began with the assumption that
the aid would be impermissible if used to fund religious education.
The Court then reasoned that there was a very real danger that the
aid allocated by this law would be misused because "a dedicated
religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith
and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great
difficulty in remaining religiously neutral." ' 1 3 In the Court's view, a
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveil-
lance" ' 1 4 therefore would be essential to ensure that the teachers
receiving salary supplements under this law teach their secular sub-
jects in a religiously neutral way. According to the Court, however,
these "prophylactic contacts" would involve "excessive and endur-
112 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
11,3 Id. at 618.
114 Id. at 619.
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ing entanglement between state and church,"" 5 and the law there-
fore must fall.1 16
Unlike the first two prongs of the Lemon test, this prong should
not be reformulated. It should be eliminated. First of all, this
prong invites courts to decide the fate of a law based upon a set of
circumstances that does not exist. There is simply no reason, how-
ever, for courts not to decide the validity of any law under the estab-
lishment clause entirely on the basis of what the state already has
done. On the one hand, if the law under review has an impermissi-
ble effect as currently administered, it should be struck down. For a
court to speculate whether measures could be adopted to avoid this
effect and, if so, whether such measures would be permissible is sim-
ply to render an advisory opinion. On the other hand, if the law
under review does not have an impermissible effect as currently ad-
ministered, it should be upheld unless the means of implementation
are impermissible and the law would have an impermissible effect if
these means were struck down.
Second, this prong requires courts to decide the permissibility
of means of implementing a law in terms of "excessive entangle-
ment." By implication, it excludes any other measures of permissi-
bility. A court should subject the means of implementing a law,
however, to the requirements for permissibility applicable to the law
itself.' 17 The means of implementing a law, no less than the law that
they implement, are action on the part of the state. Unless a court
decides the permissibility of particular state action in terms of the
purpose and effect requirements proposed in Parts I and II above,
there is no assurance that the state action does not present one of
the "three main evils" that the clause was designed to prevent.
Furthermore, if a court subjects the means of implementing a
115 Id.
116 In applying the entanglement prong, the Court at times has considered whether
the law under review threatens to generate political division along religious lines. See.
e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist.
413 U.S. 756, 794-98 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971). At least
in the past few years, however, there appears to be general agreement on the Court that
political divisiveness is not an independent basis for invalidating a law but at most a
"warning signal" that establishment clause values may be in jeopardy. See Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 703 & n.9
(Brennan, J., dissenting). I question both the practicality of any inquiry into potential
for political divisiveness and the existence of authority in the establishment clause for
making the inquiry. In light of the current status of the inquiry, however, I see no need
to press my objections here. For commentary critical of the inquiry, see Choper, supra
note 41, at 683-85; Johnson, supra note 6, at 829-31.
117 Cf Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(advocating elimination of the entanglement prong but acknowledging that "[plervasive
institutional involvement of church and state may remain relevant in deciding the effect of
a statute which is alleged to violate the Establishment Clause") (emphasis in original).
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law to the proposed purpose and effect requirements, it has no basis
for subjecting them to an "excessive entanglement" test as well.
The court would only be justified in doing so if entanglement were
both an evil that the clause was designed to prevent and an evil in-
dependent of the "three main evils" taken into account by the pro-
posed purpose and effect requirements. As the Court implicitly has
conceded, however, entanglement simply does not fit this descrip-
tion. According to the Court in Aguilar v. Felton, I " the third prong's
prohibition on excessive entanglement is "rooted in two concerns":
When the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in
matters of religious significance, the freedom of religious belief of
those who are not adherents of that denomination suffers, even
when the governmental purpose underlying the involvement is
largely secular. In addition, the freedom of even the adherents of
the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into
sacred matters. I1-9
The first of the "two concerns" identified by the Court is the ac-
knowledged evil of sponsoring religion; the second is the one of ac-
tive state involvement in religious activity. By the Court's own
admission, entanglement is therefore not an independent evil that
the clause was designed to prevent. Rather, it has significance for
establishment clause purposes only insofar as it implicates two of
the "three main evils" that the clause was designed to prevent.
To the extent that an "excessive entanglement" test leads
courts to strike down laws that they would invalidate under the pro-
posed purpose and effect requirements, it is no worse than superflu-
ous. I emphasize, however, that this test is not always so innocuous.
It invites courts to invalidate state action that they would allow to
stand under these two requirements closely tailored to the evils that
prompted adoption of the clause. Insofar as this may not be obvi-
ous, the Court's rationale for its focus on entanglement is again in-
structive. This rationale tacitly recognizes that entanglement may
exist in the absence of sponsorship or active state involvement in
religious activity. According to the Court in Aguilar, sponsorship
comes into play when "the state becomes enmeshed with a given
denomination in matters of religious significance" and active state
involvement in religious activity does so when there is "governmen-
tal intrusion into sacred matters." Entanglement, however-a
rather vague concept that the Court essentially has equated with any
contact between church and state '---frequently may take a form
that does not involve the state in the slightest in "matters of reli-
118 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
119 Id. at 409-10.
120 Particularly instructive in this regard is the discussion in Walz v. Tax Comm'n.
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gious significance" or "sacred matters." 12'
CONCLUSION
This Article calls upon the Supreme Court to make various
changes in its approach to establishment clause problems. Most no-
tably, it urges that the first prong of the Lemon test be revised to
require that the decision to adopt a law not depend upon the con-
sideration of nonsecular purposes, that the second prong be revised
to require that a law not have a substantial effect adverse to the
clause unless the law is necessary to serve a substantial governmen-
tal interest, and that the third prong focusing on entanglement be
eliminated. The Court's recent decisions reaffirming its allegiance
to the Lemon test 122 are to be applauded for their implicit rejection
for the time being of a materially less demanding approach. 23 If
the values underlying the establishment clause are to be given their
due, however, reaffirmation of the Lemon test must be only a begin-
ning. The Lemon test is in need of significant reform.
397 U.S. 664 (1970), that laid the foundation for the Court's recognition in Lemon of an
entanglement prong:
[There must not be] an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion. The test is inescapably one of degree. Either course, taxation of
[church property] or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement
with religion. Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the in-
volvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church prop-
erty, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and
conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes.
Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford
an indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser,
involvement than taxing them. In analyzing either alternative the ques-
tions are whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a contin-
uing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an
impermissible degree of entanglement. Obviously a direct money sub-
sidy would be a relationship pregnant with involvement and, as with most
governmental grant programs, could encompass sustained and detailed
administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or administra-
tive standards, but that is not this case. The hazards of churches support-
ing government are hardly less in their potential than the hazards of
government supporting churches; each relationship carries some involve-
ment rather than the desired insulation and separation....
Id. at 674-75 (footnote omitted). Note also the discussion of entanglement in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-22 (1971).
121 For criticism of the entanglement prong from other perspectives, see Choper,
supra note 41, at 681-83 (adverse implications of avoiding entanglement for "legitimate
secular pursuits or the more general value of preserving religious liberty"); Ripple, The
Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195,
1216-24 (1980) (practical problems in implementation).
122 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
123 See supra text accompanying notes 7-16.
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